Liang Qichao follow-up

Yes, yes, it's been a long time coming. I've finally gotten around to it, though.

According to his wiki, Liang Qichao was an influential intellectual in many respects, but I am most interested in his historiography, his presentation of China as a single nation.

Liang Qichao’s historiographical thought represents the beginning of modern Chinese historiography and reveals some important directions of Chinese historiography in the twentieth century.

For Liang, the major flaw of "old historians" (舊史家) was their failure to foster the national awareness necessary for a strong and modern nation. Liang's call for new history not only pointed to a new orientation for historical writing in China, but also indicated the rise of modern historical consciousness among Chinese intellectuals.

During this period of Japan's challenge in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Liang was involved in protests in Beijing pushing for an increased participation in the governance by the Chinese people. It was the first protest of its kind in modern Chinese history. This changing outlook on tradition was shown in the historiographical revolution (史學革命) launched by Liang Qichao in the early twentieth century. Frustrated by his failure at political reform, Liang embarked upon cultural reform. In 1902, while in exile in Japan, Liang wrote New History (新史學), launching attacks on traditional historiography.

All very interesting, but annoyingly vague. How exactly did "old historians" fail to foster national awareness, in his view? How did the historiographical revolution address this--what new perspective did it offer?

(You may have noticed that Liang's wiki is not one of the best written articles out there. Keep this in mind when considering its completeness and impartiality.)

His views on political philosophy come tantalizingly close to current received PRC/"East Asian" wisdom--"'Freedom means Freedom for the Group, not Freedom for the Individual. (…) Men must not be slaves to other men, but they must be slaves to their group. For, if they are not slaves to their own group, they will assuredly become slaves to some other.'" And they do dovetail nicely with Liang's stated wish to reconcile Confucianism with Western ideas--Hobbes seems to have been his preferred choice here.

But meeting and diagnosing the patient come before prescribing treatment, and those areas remain frustratingly hazy. Following the link to Chinese historiography proves equally disappointing, though Chinese nationalism bears some interesting fruit:

The official Chinese nationalistic view in the 1920s and 1930s was heavily influenced by modernism and social Darwinism, and included advocacy of the cultural assimilation of ethnic groups in the western and central provinces into the "culturally advanced" Han state, to become in name as well as in fact members of the Chinese nation. Furthermore, it was also influenced by the fate of multi-ethnic states such as Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. It also became a very powerful force during the Japanese occupation of Coastal China during the 1930s and 1940s and the atrocities committed by such regime.

Over the next decades Chinese nationalism was influenced strongly by Russian ethnographic thinking, and the official ideology of the PRC asserts that China is a multi-ethnic state, and Han Chinese, despite being the overwhelming majority (over 90% in the mainland), they are only one of many ethnic groups of China, each of whose culture and language should be respected. However, many critics* argue that despite this official view, assimilationist attitudes remain deeply entrenched, and popular views and actual power relationships create a situation in which Chinese nationalism has in practice meant Han dominance of minority areas and peoples and assimilation of those groups.

(*Allow me to clear up any Wikipedian ambiguity by noting that these "many critics" are, by and large, quite correct)

No mention of Liang Qichao here, but, interestingly enough, his wiki does mention a fascination with Social Darwinism, something I dismissed as irrelevant on my first read-through. After some thought, I realized that whoever wrote these articles doesn't define "social darwinism" the same way I do. I see it as applying the "survival of the fittest" concept to human society, with the implication that the best individuals are those who attain the most fame, money, and/or power, and vice versa, regardless of the tactics used--pretty largely removed from cultural comparisons, hence my initial dismissal of the term as used in these articles.

While that sort of social darwinism certainly isn't far removed from post-Mao China, what these articles are discussing could be more accurately described as "cultural darwinism." That is, assimilation of minority ethnic groups into the supposedly superior Han culture, as the quote describes.

According to Wikipedia, the proper Western anthropological term is cultural colonialism, the "internal domination by one group and its culture or ideology over others." The page goes on to use the U.S.S.R. as an example, noting its "domination...by Russian language and culture." As for official reasons, it notes that "The oneness of socialist internationalism was to unite all the republics and their peoples."

But cultural colonialism is not new in the world, nor is it really what Fear of a Red Planet meant by 'nationalism', is it?

As I mentioned in the previous post, the current, particularly intense brand of Chinese nationalism is largely couched in bitter memories of Western influence and control. Whatever his actual role may have been, Liang does appear to have drawn much of his motivation from a desire to see a strong, free China stand unmolested on the international stage, which in turn grew out of indignation and despair at its treatment by the West and Japan. Again, I would need to see what he wrote in greater detail in order to properly address this.

Was Liang so crucial in making this connection, though? Couldn't it be argued that the idea of a zhong hua min zu, a Chinese race, would have been a natural reaction among most Chinese to the humiliations of the 19th century? "Gentlemen, we must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately"--isn't that the basic gist of Liang's message?

Perhaps it's the combination of the abovementioned socialist internationalism and memory of past humiliations that has made Chinese nationalism so potent...I really must research this further.

The "China model"

Courtesy of Sullivan, I happened upon a very insightful post by Fear Of A Red Planet concerning China's potential as an example to developing countries; that is, "a single-party dictatorship combined with relative economic freedom." Those of you with an interest in international politics may be familiar with the term "the China model." And, ceteris paribus, I have generally agreed that the China model can be transplanted to other countries looking for rapid growth without any pesky democratic constraints.

FOARP, however, argues that the "Chinese model" relies on factors unique to China, citing, among other things, the recent (19th-20th century) development of the idea of a Chinese national identity. A certain Liang Qichao ('Leeang Cheechow,' 1873-1929) apparently figured largely in this transformation, which I find particularly intriguing as I've never heard of him. The argument runs thusly:

Thirdly, this ignores the essential glue that holds together the Chinese state under circumstances not dissimilar to those which tore Yugoslavia and the USSR apart: nationalism. Firstly under the nationalists and now under the communists China has been subject to the greatest and most successful program of nation-building ever seen.

Whilst in India there are reportedly still whole villages in which nobody has ever heard of the country ‘India’, since 1912 the Chinese nation has steadily been built up, with ethnic and regional loyalties largely subsumed into the Chinese identity or race (中华民族 [zhong hua min zu]). Whilst it is generally believed in China that this identity has existed for thousands of years, it is in fact an invention of nineteenth century theorists like Liang Qichao (梁啟超), intended to replace an imperial system fairly similar to the one that existed in the Austro-Hungarian or Russian empires. This has largely succeeded, and it is only in those areas with ethnic identities so entirely different to that of the majority as to be incompatible (such as Tibet and Xinjiang) that it has failed.

The high level of nationalism in China (Australian China-hand Ross Terrill described it as “the nearest thing China has to a national religion”) has allowed the Chinese state to survive pressures which would shatter other countries, as such the Chinese model cannot simply be transplanted to countries with strong regional identities.

I'll definitely check out Liang Qichao. Fascinating thesis, as Chinese nationalism and its causes remain a subject of great debate. Additionally, this gels with what I know of it so far.

Which is: post-dynastic, pre-Japanese invasion (1912-1931~37) China was a chaotic, often lawless place where regional warlords regularly battled each other for supremacy. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, the Nationalists, or KMT, fought a bitter civil war against Mao's Communists for four more years before being driven off to Taiwan.*

The Chinese people, as much as they can be said to form a single entity--not counting the Tibetan, Uighur, and other official minorities, of course, so I guess I should say Han Chinese within China--have a very clear and bitter memory of the pre-1949 chaos, often lumped in with equally bitter memories of being divided up under colonial occupation. National unity and solidarity is considered paramount, and special hatred is reserved for secessionism or anything hinting of it.** Most of all at the governmental level, of course, but I know from firsthand experience that the average Chinese person (men more than women), while generally no foaming-at-the mouth xenophobe, will become firmly nationalistic if pressed. Significantly, the sort of insecure, reactionary nationalism often borne of past humiliation and shame, the bitter realization of status lost accompanied by the iron determination to regain one's rightful place. As such, more reminiscent of Putin's Russia than of the otherwise comparable India.

With this in mind, the poster definitely seems to be on to something here. I may post a follow up after reading about Liang Qichao. I'm still amazed I've never heard of him, which leads me to wonder whether FOARP is not giving him more credit than is due, but I'm keeping an open mind.






*Where they eventually developed into the current Republic of China and now form one of the island's two major political parties, the other being the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP.

**Hence the PRC's especially intense stance and violent rhetoric concerning Tibet (the Dalai Lama has "the heart of a jackal") and Taiwan (pro-independence former VP Annette Lu is "insane" and "scum of the earth").

Is 'bombast' a necessity?

Caught an interesting NYT article on the economic and diplomatic inroads that China quietly made in Latin America during the Bush years. For those unfamiliar with the state of relations between that Administration and our southern neighbors, let's just say 'antarctic' wouldn't be far off. Indeed, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, love him or hate him, probably owes a good part of his career to the seething contempt for Bush that characterizes the region.

One thing jumped out at me near the end.

Despite forging ties to Venezuela and extending loans to other nations that have chafed at Washington’s clout, Beijing has bolstered its presence without bombast, perhaps out of an awareness that its relationship with the United States is still of paramount importance. But this deference may not last.

“This is China playing the long game,” said Gregory Chin, a political scientist at York University in Toronto. “If this ultimately translates into political influence, then that is how the game is played.”

This seems to imply that the default or preferred state for a superpower, or any power at all, is 'bombast', the lack or absence of which is considered 'deference'. Notwithstanding that this strikes me as a false dichotomy, how is bombast anything more than a luxury, indulged at one's own risk? China is strengthening its hand in real terms, whether it trumpets this to the skies or not. Even if it were the biggest fish in the pond, I fail to see how this sort of bragging could do anything to advance its agenda. If anything, it would hurt their interests.

I'm curious; is this sort of thinking a product of the past 8 years--though they should have been enough to show anyone the folly of bombast in foreign relations--or is it simply a generally accepted principle? Were I to helm a superpower, I would do my utmost to keep everything as simple and low profile as possible; attracting attention and riling people up would only hinder my cause in the long run. Something to ponder, anyway.

That final paragraph reminds me a bit of why I'm such a fan of Machiavelli and Sun Tzu; I'll make a follow up post at some point to discuss those interests in greater detail.

As promised, a real New Year's

Not particularly safe, but definitely fun. Felt like a warzone at times (two solid weeks of nonstop fireworks everywhere, day and night). All hail the Year of the Dog!

Sunday New Year's

Just got back from Washington, D.C.'s Chinese New Year celebrations. My Taiwanese coworkers at TECRO (Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, in lieu of an Embassy due to the Taiwan-China dispute) encouraged me to go. I assumed we'd all stand on the sidelines and watch the procession of dancing dragons and such go by. Turns out we were part of the parade!

Not the dragons, of course, but simply marching with lines of alternating Taiwanese and American flags. I initially felt a bit self-conscious, as I was the sole white guy in a sea of Chinese, but then I remembered the 8 months I'd spent in exactly the same position while studying in China, and it was easily shrugged off. I'd never been in any kind of parade before, either--it was neat to try out the opposite perspective. And so many people! Perhaps in New York or San Francisco I would have expected a big deal, but we actually had a pretty good turnout.

The parade appeared to have been organized and put on entirely by the Taiwan Chinese population of the District, with the only sign of the mainland being a large PRC (People's Republic of China) flag on display at a souvenir stand. I must admit I felt a few brief pangs of worry that taking part and associating myself so visibly with the ROC (Republic of China) flag might affect my chances of future employment on the Mainland, but barring an unexpected downturn in currently upbeat cross-straits relations, I highly doubt it.

The parade ended with several speeches by Taiwanese and D.C. government dignitaries, including one surprisingly interesting one by a D.C. "senator" whose name escapes me. This fellow spoke of the lack of official representation from which D.C. and Taiwan both suffer, and gave a rousing call to action for both parties. I'm not sure I'd give much for Taiwan's chances of representation, what with the current government's stated desire somewhere between "don't talk about it" and "eventual reunification", plus a very large neighbor threatening instant annihilation or at least invasion at the first sign of declared independence, but it was a nice thought. Sigh, and for all that, D.C.'s chances are probably pretty equivalent, so I suppose it was an apt comparison.

I did see current Council member and former mayor Marion Barry up there with the officials, and I'd never seen him before despite having heard so much about him, so that was kind of cool.

The whole event was scheduled to end with an awesome Chinese firecracker display so long that it had to be held up by a crane, but the DCFD came along at the last minute and cancelled it. Admittedly, there may have been some hidden issue of which I was unaware, but come on guys, it's just a bunch of gunpowder packed in paper held up by a crane. They even pushed the crowd back far enough to form a good-sized empty circle before the DCFD showed up, which probably wasn't necessary. If the fire department thought this was dangerous, they would have had a collective heart attack at the week-long celebrations in Beijing (videos forthcoming!).

Ah well, still a fun time in the parade. Happy Year of the Ox!