The "China model"

Courtesy of Sullivan, I happened upon a very insightful post by Fear Of A Red Planet concerning China's potential as an example to developing countries; that is, "a single-party dictatorship combined with relative economic freedom." Those of you with an interest in international politics may be familiar with the term "the China model." And, ceteris paribus, I have generally agreed that the China model can be transplanted to other countries looking for rapid growth without any pesky democratic constraints.

FOARP, however, argues that the "Chinese model" relies on factors unique to China, citing, among other things, the recent (19th-20th century) development of the idea of a Chinese national identity. A certain Liang Qichao ('Leeang Cheechow,' 1873-1929) apparently figured largely in this transformation, which I find particularly intriguing as I've never heard of him. The argument runs thusly:

Thirdly, this ignores the essential glue that holds together the Chinese state under circumstances not dissimilar to those which tore Yugoslavia and the USSR apart: nationalism. Firstly under the nationalists and now under the communists China has been subject to the greatest and most successful program of nation-building ever seen.

Whilst in India there are reportedly still whole villages in which nobody has ever heard of the country ‘India’, since 1912 the Chinese nation has steadily been built up, with ethnic and regional loyalties largely subsumed into the Chinese identity or race (中华民族 [zhong hua min zu]). Whilst it is generally believed in China that this identity has existed for thousands of years, it is in fact an invention of nineteenth century theorists like Liang Qichao (梁啟超), intended to replace an imperial system fairly similar to the one that existed in the Austro-Hungarian or Russian empires. This has largely succeeded, and it is only in those areas with ethnic identities so entirely different to that of the majority as to be incompatible (such as Tibet and Xinjiang) that it has failed.

The high level of nationalism in China (Australian China-hand Ross Terrill described it as “the nearest thing China has to a national religion”) has allowed the Chinese state to survive pressures which would shatter other countries, as such the Chinese model cannot simply be transplanted to countries with strong regional identities.

I'll definitely check out Liang Qichao. Fascinating thesis, as Chinese nationalism and its causes remain a subject of great debate. Additionally, this gels with what I know of it so far.

Which is: post-dynastic, pre-Japanese invasion (1912-1931~37) China was a chaotic, often lawless place where regional warlords regularly battled each other for supremacy. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, the Nationalists, or KMT, fought a bitter civil war against Mao's Communists for four more years before being driven off to Taiwan.*

The Chinese people, as much as they can be said to form a single entity--not counting the Tibetan, Uighur, and other official minorities, of course, so I guess I should say Han Chinese within China--have a very clear and bitter memory of the pre-1949 chaos, often lumped in with equally bitter memories of being divided up under colonial occupation. National unity and solidarity is considered paramount, and special hatred is reserved for secessionism or anything hinting of it.** Most of all at the governmental level, of course, but I know from firsthand experience that the average Chinese person (men more than women), while generally no foaming-at-the mouth xenophobe, will become firmly nationalistic if pressed. Significantly, the sort of insecure, reactionary nationalism often borne of past humiliation and shame, the bitter realization of status lost accompanied by the iron determination to regain one's rightful place. As such, more reminiscent of Putin's Russia than of the otherwise comparable India.

With this in mind, the poster definitely seems to be on to something here. I may post a follow up after reading about Liang Qichao. I'm still amazed I've never heard of him, which leads me to wonder whether FOARP is not giving him more credit than is due, but I'm keeping an open mind.






*Where they eventually developed into the current Republic of China and now form one of the island's two major political parties, the other being the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP.

**Hence the PRC's especially intense stance and violent rhetoric concerning Tibet (the Dalai Lama has "the heart of a jackal") and Taiwan (pro-independence former VP Annette Lu is "insane" and "scum of the earth").

Ross Douthat on Palin's resignation

This excerpt from Ross Douthat’s latest NYT column may seem a bit bizarre at first:

Palin’s popularity has as much to do with class as it does with ideology. In this sense, she really is the perfect foil for Barack Obama. Our president represents the meritocratic ideal — that anyone, from any background, can grow up to attend Columbia and Harvard Law School and become a great American success story. But Sarah Palin represents the democratic ideal — that anyone can grow up to be a great success story without graduating from Columbia and Harvard.

First, we have meritocracy positioned opposite democracy. Funny, I had thought that democracy was the best route to meritocracy, that the two generally complimented each other—electing, and more importantly reelecting,* people based on performance. Yet somehow Douthat finds them opposed.

In order to do that, he has to gut the phrase “democratic ideal” of its core spirit, at least as we know it—election based on popularity, itself due to performance**—leaving only the barest of shells: election based on popularity, itself due to…“success,” which he leaves undefined. Oh, but the important thing is, he tells is, that she stands as a representative of the working class, Real American Values. Just keep that in mind, everybody.

So, election based on popularity, itself based on…ah…what? Just popularity via, in Palin’s case, cultural identification? Republican pollster Alex Castellanos, of the (in)famous “white hands” ad, does admit that “…with Republicans her support is not based on her record as governor of Alaska.”***

It’s not a meritocracy, then, I’ll give Douthat that. And it is indeed a form of democracy; in fact, Plato himself considered this form—rule based purely on immediate mass appeal, whether due to identification with a certain class, pacification through “bread and circuses,” or other means—to be the most accurate definition of the word. The philosopher also ranked it as the worst possible form of government for precisely this reason, behind even oligarchy, rule by merchants (his definition).

Douthat’s passage makes sense, then, if you assume he’s talking about “democratic ideals” as a Platonian. For some reason, I don’t think he would agree...but rather than accuse such an esteemed thinker of intellectual dishonesty or inconsistency, let’s go with this reading.

Our president represents the meritocratic ideal — that anyone, from any background, can grow up to attend Columbia and Harvard Law School and become a great American success story, rising by virtue of merit alone. But Sarah Palin represents the democratic ideal — that anyone can grow up to be a charismatic, shallow, power-hungry egomaniac† without graduating from Columbia and Harvard.

The man finally writes a column I can agree with! Good to be on the same side for once, Ross.

*Something that Palin, perhaps not coincidentally, has just taken off the table.
** Often correlated with some measure of intellect and open-mindedness.
***Full quote: “For independents and Democrats, [Palin's] already not their candidate, and with Republicans her support is not based on her record as governor of Alaska.”
†A universally human sort of success story--Ross was even careful enough to leave "American" out in the original piece