More on Iran

The previous post was heavy on background and short on current events, so I'll address more current issues in this one. All articles linked are courtesy of the Dish unless otherwise noted.

First, further analysis and news of the situation in Iran. It goes without saying that, considering the frustratingly murky nature of everything surrounding this election and its aftermath, most of the following should be taken with a grain of salt.

--Except for this: a statistical analysis of the official vote counts as reported by the Iranian Ministry of the Interior.

--Continuing in that vein, here's a good summary by the CS Monitor of the case that the election was rigged.

--Some have argued that rural Iranians, more traditionalist and conservative than their urban counterparts, went strongly for Ahmadinejad. However, one analysis of Iran's rural vote shows economic worries trumping everything else, to the incumbent's detriment. The report also emphasizes, though, that rural Iranian antipathy towards Ahmadinejad does not extend to the idea of the Islamic Republic, though certain reforms may be welcomed.

--Regardless of which side an Iranian may have initially taken in the election, polls indicate that respect for free speech and free and fair elections transcends party lines in Iran. As such, tactics like blatant vote rigging, using violence to suppress peaceful demonstrations, photoshopping pictures of his own rallies, etc. may backfire badly on Ahmadinejad, drawing comparisons with the suppression and unrest that preceded the 1979 revolution.

--Speaking of suppression and violence, never forget Moral High Ground Rule #1: do not be [seen as] the aggressor.* In the current unrest, restraint is key to legitimacy, a fact not lost on either side:

What we are witnessing, from afar and through contrasting methods of information control (the regime by filtering the flow of information, the opposition by not filtering it), is a struggle for power, where both sides' legitimacy depends upon not being the aggressor in the event of violence. That's why, notwithstanding the opposition's dramatic demonstrations and the regime's brutal but relatively limited repressive measures, both sides have essentially been playing for time. It's as if two armies were maneuvering in close proximity, knowing that the first one to open fire loses.

Mousavi, especially, benefits from this, as violence is a far riskier option for his side than Ahmadinejad's, which enjoys the backing of the Basij and probably most of the Revolutionary Guard. He appears to be milking this benefit for everything he can.

--An Iran expert writing for the New Republic agrees with the general analysis of that New York Times AEI op-ed, if not its conclusions. In his eagerness to take down Mousavi, Khamenei may be unleashing forces beyond his control.

--An abortive olive branch bid for time in the form of a recount proposal appears to be DOA. At this point, Mousavi stands to gain more by rebuffing and delegitimizing it than he would by agreeing. Aaaaaand it looks like he wasn't wrong to reject the 'limited recount':

According to the New York Times, Fars News Agency reports a partial “recounting” of votes has begun in Iran. But they are not being counted. They were not even counted the first time. Fars says the “recount” in the Kurdish province of Kermanshah shows “no irregularity.”

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has almost no support among Kurds whatsoever. Claiming he “won” 70 percent in Kermanshah is as outlandish as Dick Cheney winning San Francisco and Berkeley in a landslide.

This is followed by a quote from a Kurdish separatist commander "just on the Iraq side of the Iran-Iraq border near Kermanshah," saying that there was zero if any Iranian Kurdish participation in the elections.

Kurdish-inhabited regions, for reference:



I'll deal with the less time-sensitive American side of the equation in my next post.

One final note: for those of you receiving my posts by email, I edited my previous Iran post somewhat after I published it for the first time (which triggers the email). It's not substantially different, though I certainly hope it's an improvement over the emailed version.

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*This has held true throughout history. Tellingly, aggressors have occasionally gone to some lengths to play the role of innocent victim, even if only to muddy the waters and play for time until battle is joined. On the other end of the spectrum, some forewarned defenders have deliberately forsaken a preemptive strike in order to retain the moral high ground--generally for quite concrete reasons, of course.

The Yom Kippur War makes for a great case study of this phenomenon. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, made aware at the last minute of Arab plans for a surprise attack, intentionally allowed them to strike first. The thinking was that maintaining good international standing and ensuring an uninterrupted supply of American aid in the ensuing conflict was more valuable than any advantage gained by a preemptive strike. In Meir's words, "'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody.'" [Do note, however, that this was by no means the optimal situation: "It was assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, at the worst case, about 48 hours notice prior to an Arab attack," in which case Israeli strategy did call for a preemptive strike. Meir had barely 6 hours, an intelligence failure largely responsible for the postwar collapse of her government.]

Though initially costly, the war did end in an Israeli victory, a victory probably impossible without American aid--early on, the situation looked so grim that Meir actually authorized the crash construction of nuclear weapons. Additionally, for what it's worth, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger later remarked that "had Israel struck first, they would not have received 'so much as a nail.'"